[Discussion] On the Gods and the World, Ch. XVII

[sdi]

Happy Wednesday to you all once again: this week's chapter is longer than we've seen in a while. Let's pick the puzzle-box right back up, shall we?

XVII. That the World is by nature Eternal.

We have shown above that the gods will not destroy the world. It remains to show that its nature is indestructible.

Everything that is destroyed is either destroyed by itself or by something else. If the world is destroyed by itself, fire must needs burn itself and water dry itself. If by something else, it must be either by a body or by something incorporeal. By something incorporeal is impossible; for incorporeal things preserve bodies—nature, for instance, and soul—and nothing is destroyed by a cause whose nature is to preserve it. If it is destroyed by some body, it must be either by those which exist or by others.

If by those which exist: then either those moving in a straight line must be destroyed by those that revolve, or vice versa. But those that revolve have no destructive nature; else, why do we never see anything destroyed from that cause? Nor yet can those which are moving straight touch the others; else, why have they never been able to do so yet?

But neither can those moving straight be destroyed by one another: for the destruction of one is the creation of another; and that is not to be destroyed but to change.

But if the World is to be destroyed by other bodies than these it is impossible to say where such bodies are or whence they are to arise.

Again, everything destroyed is destroyed either in form or matter. (Form is the shape of a thing, matter the body.) Now if the form is destroyed and the matter remains, we see other things come into being. If matter is destroyed, how is it that the supply has not failed in all these years?

If when matter is destroyed other matter takes its place, the new matter must come either from something that is or from something that is not. If from that-which-is, as long as that-which-is always remains, matter always remains. But if that-which-is is destroyed, such a theory means that not the World only but everything in the universe is destroyed.

If again matter comes from that-which-is-not: in the first place, it is impossible for anything to come from that which is not; but suppose it to happen, and that matter did arise from that which is not; then, as long as there are things which are not, matter will exist. For I presume there can never be an end of things which are not.

If they say that matter <will become> formless: in the first place, why does this happen to the world as a whole when it does not happen to any part? Secondly, by this hypothesis they do not destroy the being of bodies, but only their beauty.

Further, everything destroyed is either resolved into the elements from which it came, or else vanishes into not-being. If things are resolved into the elements from which they came, then there will be others: else how did they come into being at all? If that-which-is is to depart into not-being, what prevents that happening to God himself? (Which is absurd.) Or if God's power prevents that, it is not a mark of power to be able to save nothing but oneself. And it is equally impossible for that-which-is to come out of nothing and to depart into nothing.

Again, if the World is destroyed, it must needs either be destroyed according to Nature or against Nature. Against Nature is impossible, for that which is against nature is not stronger than Nature.* If according to Nature, there must be another Nature which changes the Nature of the World: which does not appear.

Again, anything that is naturally destructible we can ourselves destroy. But no one has ever destroyed or altered the round body of the World. And the elements, though they can be changed, cannot be destroyed. Again, everything destructible is changed by time and grows old. But the world through all these years has remained utterly unchanged.

Having said so much for the help of those who feel the need of very strong demonstrations, I pray the World himself† to be gracious to me.

* Gilbert Murray notes, "The text here is imperfect: I have followed Mullach's correction."

Arthur Darby Nock translates the paragraph, "Then too, the universe, if it perishes, must perish either in accordance with nature or contrary to nature. <If it perishes in accordance with nature, then the making and continuance till now of the universe prove to be unnatural, and yet nothing is made contrary to nature,> nor does what is contrary to nature take precedence over nature. If it perishes contrary to nature, there must be another nature changing the nature of the universe, and this we do not see."

† Nock gives "itself." (Thomas Taylor uses a construction which avoids pronouns altogether.)

Comments

[sdi]

Nock's commentary to Ch. VII says the following:

There are, says Tzetzes, four views of the philosophers:

1. The universe is uncreated and imperishable.
2. It is created and perishable (ascribed to Meton).
3. It is uncreated, except for certain perishable parts.
4. It is created, but by Divine Providence will not perish (ascribed to Plato and Pythagoras).

The matter has long been disputed: Diodorus Siculus mentions views (1) and (2), Philo in his treatise De æternitate mundi (1), (2), (4), quoting for (1) Aristotle and Ocellus, for (4) the Timæus (at second hand), Hesiod, and Moses.

I would assume the view as I was taught falls into category (4), that the universe is created but sustained by Divine Providence, since God promised Noah (and and his descendants) that he would never again destroy the world (Gen. 9), but I cannot speak with any authority about classical philosophy.

[barefootwisdom]

Thank you for this. I'm really not familiar with Philo's work, and may need to remedy that at some point.

As to Philo's authorities (as cited by Nock, cited by you, etc.,--what a crazy telephone game!): Hesiod is an interesting choice, given what we might call the more "mythological" rather than "philosophical" register in which he's writing. As to Plato's Timaeus, that's precisely what's at issue in all the dueling commentaries and treatises "On the Eternity of the World" put out by various thinkers over the centuries.

I can totally see Moses (and the dialogue with Noah) as taking this position; but while it's well-attested that Moses spoke both Egyptian and Hebrew, I'd not put him in the group of Greek-speakers. :) Joking aside, I think this actually illustrates the point: Hesiod notwithstanding, what we're looking at is a confrontation between the Hellenic worldview (of an eternal and/or cyclic cosmos) and the Semitic one (as picked up by the Galileans).