[Discussion] On the Gods and the World, Ch. XVII

[sdi]

Happy Wednesday to you all once again: this week's chapter is longer than we've seen in a while. Let's pick the puzzle-box right back up, shall we?

XVII. That the World is by nature Eternal.

We have shown above that the gods will not destroy the world. It remains to show that its nature is indestructible.

Everything that is destroyed is either destroyed by itself or by something else. If the world is destroyed by itself, fire must needs burn itself and water dry itself. If by something else, it must be either by a body or by something incorporeal. By something incorporeal is impossible; for incorporeal things preserve bodies—nature, for instance, and soul—and nothing is destroyed by a cause whose nature is to preserve it. If it is destroyed by some body, it must be either by those which exist or by others.

If by those which exist: then either those moving in a straight line must be destroyed by those that revolve, or vice versa. But those that revolve have no destructive nature; else, why do we never see anything destroyed from that cause? Nor yet can those which are moving straight touch the others; else, why have they never been able to do so yet?

But neither can those moving straight be destroyed by one another: for the destruction of one is the creation of another; and that is not to be destroyed but to change.

But if the World is to be destroyed by other bodies than these it is impossible to say where such bodies are or whence they are to arise.

Again, everything destroyed is destroyed either in form or matter. (Form is the shape of a thing, matter the body.) Now if the form is destroyed and the matter remains, we see other things come into being. If matter is destroyed, how is it that the supply has not failed in all these years?

If when matter is destroyed other matter takes its place, the new matter must come either from something that is or from something that is not. If from that-which-is, as long as that-which-is always remains, matter always remains. But if that-which-is is destroyed, such a theory means that not the World only but everything in the universe is destroyed.

If again matter comes from that-which-is-not: in the first place, it is impossible for anything to come from that which is not; but suppose it to happen, and that matter did arise from that which is not; then, as long as there are things which are not, matter will exist. For I presume there can never be an end of things which are not.

If they say that matter <will become> formless: in the first place, why does this happen to the world as a whole when it does not happen to any part? Secondly, by this hypothesis they do not destroy the being of bodies, but only their beauty.

Further, everything destroyed is either resolved into the elements from which it came, or else vanishes into not-being. If things are resolved into the elements from which they came, then there will be others: else how did they come into being at all? If that-which-is is to depart into not-being, what prevents that happening to God himself? (Which is absurd.) Or if God's power prevents that, it is not a mark of power to be able to save nothing but oneself. And it is equally impossible for that-which-is to come out of nothing and to depart into nothing.

Again, if the World is destroyed, it must needs either be destroyed according to Nature or against Nature. Against Nature is impossible, for that which is against nature is not stronger than Nature.* If according to Nature, there must be another Nature which changes the Nature of the World: which does not appear.

Again, anything that is naturally destructible we can ourselves destroy. But no one has ever destroyed or altered the round body of the World. And the elements, though they can be changed, cannot be destroyed. Again, everything destructible is changed by time and grows old. But the world through all these years has remained utterly unchanged.

Having said so much for the help of those who feel the need of very strong demonstrations, I pray the World himself† to be gracious to me.

* Gilbert Murray notes, "The text here is imperfect: I have followed Mullach's correction."

Arthur Darby Nock translates the paragraph, "Then too, the universe, if it perishes, must perish either in accordance with nature or contrary to nature. <If it perishes in accordance with nature, then the making and continuance till now of the universe prove to be unnatural, and yet nothing is made contrary to nature,> nor does what is contrary to nature take precedence over nature. If it perishes contrary to nature, there must be another nature changing the nature of the universe, and this we do not see."

† Nock gives "itself." (Thomas Taylor uses a construction which avoids pronouns altogether.)

Comments

[sdi]

Unfortunately, I've been dealing with a lot of brain fog this last week and have had a difficult time parsing this chapter. (I apologize if my transcription contains errors!) I found Nock's paraphrase of the chapter helpful, and I have transcribed it below:

XVII. We have stated that the gods will not destroy the universe. It must be added that its nature is indestructible. It might be supposed to be destroyed:

1. by itself;
2. by something else which exists, corporeal or incorporeal; a rectilinear movent (i. e. an element) clashing against an orbital movent (i. e. a planet), or vice versa;
3. by something else not in the sum of things existent.

But in none of these ways is its destruction possible. Destruction must be in form: but this does not affect matter, since new products arise, or in matter. But matter either perishes and is not replaced (if so, why has it lasted so long?) or perishes and is replaced (if so, either

1. from things existing: but if supply lasts for ever, so will the universe. If it does not, all things existing perish;
2. or from things not existing: This is impossible: still, were it true, while non-existents are the universe will continue to be. Surely non-existents do not also perish).

If matter survives but will lose all form, why do we not see this happening to parts of the whole? In any case, on this hypothesis it is the beauty, not the existence of things, that will perish.

Further, what perishes must

1. be resolved into its components: then something else results;
2. vanish. If so, surely God would vanish. If His power prevents that, it cannot be limited to self-preservation.

Again, if the universe perishes, it must perish

1. according to nature. But this would imply that it came into being contrary to nature; and what can so perish we can destroy; on the contrary we can change elements, but we cannot destroy them;
2. contrary to nature: this would require the existence of another nature changing the nature of the universe. But this in unproved.

Whatever perishes is subject to old age; and yet the universe is unchanged after the immense lapse of time. This should prove sufficient for those who require stronger proofs. May the universe be propitious to me.

[sdi]

It's odd to me just how much effort Sallustius has spent on the specific topic of the eternal nature of the world: this is the third chapter discussing it, following chapters VII and XIII. I would think the brief argument given originally—the world is the natural byproduct of the Gods actions, and since the Gods are eternal, so too must be the world—to be quite sufficient, especially in a short text like this one.

Does anyone know why he belabors the point so? Nock doesn't provide much context besides noting that it was a point of much dispute in classical philosophy generally. I am still reading Murray am not yet sure if her discusses it.

[barefootwisdom]

This was specifically a dispute against the Christians. It comes down to a really fundamental difference in one's entire worldview/cosmology:

For the traditional pagan philosophers, as you say, the world is eternal, forever proceeding from the Gods. This chapter also implies a corollary to this: a kind of *goodness* to that world, insofar as the world is not inclined to decay by its very nature. Note as well the way in which the argument in this chapter at least implies the view that the world had no *beginning* in time: roughly, given how long (perhaps forever!) the world has already been around, if it were going to fall apart on its own, it would have already done so!

For the Christians, on the other hand, the world was created at a particular moment in time, will move through a very particular trajectory in time, and then come to an end—after which there will never be another one like it(!). This calls into question not only "eternality" as such, but also the goodness and sufficiency of the world.

This basic difference in orientation makes a huge difference for how you approach philosophy and theology in general, and at Sallustius' time, also came with life-and-death political and social implications.

And even within Christian intellectual circles, this is an issue that never really went away. One of the biggest barriers to allowing the teaching of Aristotle in the European Middle Ages was precisely his unambigious defense of an eternally-existing cosmos!

[boccaderlupo]

barefootwisdom beat me to it. Spot on.

[barefootwisdom]

What can I say, other than I woke up early this morning? ;)

Thanks!

[sdi]

Thanks for this.

I was taught, growing up, that Revelations didn't speak of destroying the universe and creating a different replacement from new material so much as "perfecting" the existing one, so I had simply assumed "the universe exists forever (after it was created)" was basic Christian theology. I suppose there is a lot of room for dispute there, as with everything else!

[barefootwisdom]

You're most welcome.

I'm actually not aware of any Greek-speaking philosophers of antiquity who took the view that the cosmos had a beginning but not an end in time (though I'd welcome correction, if anyone does know of a counter-example!).

All the major players in this debate, in late antiquity, take creation and destruction to go together: either the cosmos had/will have both a beginning an end in time, or it had/will have neither of these.

On the latter (Platonic) view, the "coupling" of these follows from the way in which we're thinking about the divine causes of the universe: (a) as Final Cause, the transcendent Good at which everything is always aiming, (b) as Paradigmatic Cause, and (c) as Efficient or Demiurgic cause, who (as Plato describes in the Timaeus) looks to that eternal paradigm and brings it into manifestation in order to realize that Good. What's important is that all three of these causes are eternal in the strongest sense: they are outside of time, and they are themselves utterly unchanging: recall here the discussion we had a few months back about how the Gods cannot possibly change, either for the better or for the worse.

So, because these transcendent causes are independent of time, and are themselves utterly unchanging, there's no good reason why they would bring about their effect (the existence of the cosmos) at one time but not another.

That's the general line. Of course, if that basic account is not compelling, then we might need to start playing whack-a-mole, as various "good reasons" for that temporal variation are considered and refuted. But I take it that this strong account of eternity and divine unchangeability are at the root of the Platonic position.

[sdi]

Nock's commentary to Ch. VII says the following:

There are, says Tzetzes, four views of the philosophers:

1. The universe is uncreated and imperishable.
2. It is created and perishable (ascribed to Meton).
3. It is uncreated, except for certain perishable parts.
4. It is created, but by Divine Providence will not perish (ascribed to Plato and Pythagoras).

The matter has long been disputed: Diodorus Siculus mentions views (1) and (2), Philo in his treatise De æternitate mundi (1), (2), (4), quoting for (1) Aristotle and Ocellus, for (4) the Timæus (at second hand), Hesiod, and Moses.

I would assume the view as I was taught falls into category (4), that the universe is created but sustained by Divine Providence, since God promised Noah (and and his descendants) that he would never again destroy the world (Gen. 9), but I cannot speak with any authority about classical philosophy.

[barefootwisdom]

Thank you for this. I'm really not familiar with Philo's work, and may need to remedy that at some point.

As to Philo's authorities (as cited by Nock, cited by you, etc.,--what a crazy telephone game!): Hesiod is an interesting choice, given what we might call the more "mythological" rather than "philosophical" register in which he's writing. As to Plato's Timaeus, that's precisely what's at issue in all the dueling commentaries and treatises "On the Eternity of the World" put out by various thinkers over the centuries.

I can totally see Moses (and the dialogue with Noah) as taking this position; but while it's well-attested that Moses spoke both Egyptian and Hebrew, I'd not put him in the group of Greek-speakers. :) Joking aside, I think this actually illustrates the point: Hesiod notwithstanding, what we're looking at is a confrontation between the Hellenic worldview (of an eternal and/or cyclic cosmos) and the Semitic one (as picked up by the Galileans).

[boccaderlupo]

One of the things you well noted is the connection back to that original mode of thinking about the unchanging nature of the gods. The passage from Sallustius is indeed dense, but one of those recurring strategies or modes of thought, as it were, is contemplating these "larger than life" (literally, beyond Being) aspects of reality as far as one can in a "Positive" way, only to exhaust the ideas and their alternatives. Not sure if I'm explaining it right, but I feel like the approaches are similar.

Some later Christian thinkers tried to marry the two visions, of a time-limited vs. eternal universe, with the concept of the Aion, which denotes finite amount of time (or a cycle) enclosed within Eternity, as it were. The issue this raised, as I understand it, was whether Christ's sacrifice was then unique: occurring in this particular aion, did it provide surety for all time, or just this particular cycle? If it wasn't unique...then what? And ultimately, a finite amount of time backstopped by an eternity that generates other such finite amounts suggests, then, that the Eternal is the default mode for the Universe.

[sdi]

Gilbert Murray illustrates this why in Five Stages of Greek Religion:

The reason [the author is at such pains to show that the world is, in itself, eternal], I think, is that the Christians were still, as in apostolic times, pinning their faith to the approaching end of the world by fire. They announced the end of the world as near, and they rejoiced in the prospect of its destruction. History has shown more than once what terrible results can be produced by such beliefs as these in the minds of excitable and suffering populations, especially those of eastern blood. It was widely believed that Christian fanatics had from time to time actually tried to light fires which should consume the accursed world and thus hasten the coming of the kingdom which should bring such incalculable rewards to their own organization and plunge the rest of mankind in everlasting torment. To any respectable Pagan such action was an insane crime made worse by a diabolical motive. The destruction of the world, therefore, seems to have become a subject of profound irritation, if not actually of terror. At any rate the doctrine lay at the very heart of the perniciosa superstitio, and Sallustius uses his best dialectic against it.

[sdi]

It was widely believed that Christian fanatics had from time to time actually tried to light fires which should consume the accursed world

I am reminded of the Trinity nuclear test, which some of those involved worried could potentially ignite the atmosphere and destroy biological life. "Insane crime made worse by diabolical motive" strikes me as being the correct term for such a thing, but then don't those words describe nearly the entirety of the last century? The world in which we live has become like Wonderland:

[Alice] tried another question. "What sort of people live about here?"

"In that direction," the [Cheshire] Cat said, waving its right paw round, "lives a Hatter: and in that direction," waving the other paw, "lives a March Hare. Visit either you like: they're both mad."

"But I don't want to go among mad people," Alice remarked.

"Oh, you can't help that," said the Cat: "we're all mad here. I'm mad. You're mad."

"How do you know I'm mad?" said Alice.

"You must be," said the Cat, "or you wouldn't have come here."

So if we are in times like Sallustius, I think it all the more appropriate to be studying his words, and the spirit in which he made them, with care!

[barefootwisdom]

It's also worth calling attention to a sentence in the middle of this chapter, for understanding how the interplay of form and matter works—and for the relationship between being, goodness, and beauty:

If they say that matter [will become] formless [...], by this hypothesis they do not destroy the being of bodies, but only their beauty.

[sdi]

When I was first introduced to astrology, I found it curious how Venus was associated with earth: I would have assumed love and beauty to be watery concepts. But of course, what you're calling out is exactly why.

I phrased this to myself as, "you can't make a cup out of water."