sdi: Photograph of the title page of Sallustius' "On the Gods and the World." (on the gods and the world)

Happy Wednesday! Perhaps surprisingly for this week’s controversial subject, none of our three translators give notes for this chapter: so I suppose we are on our own! Boldly, then, let us pick the puzzle-box back up, shall we?

XII. The origin of evil things; and that there is no positive evil.

The Gods being good and making all things, how do evils exist in the world? Or perhaps it is better first to state the fact that, the Gods being good and making all things, there is no positive evil, it only comes by absence of good; just as darkness itself does not exist, but only comes about by absence of light.

If Evil exists it must exist either in Gods or minds or souls or bodies. It does not exist in any god, for all god is good. If any one speaks of a 'bad mind' he means a mind without mind. If of a bad soul, he will make soul inferior to body, for no body in itself is evil. If he says that Evil is made up of soul and body together, it is absurd that separately they should not be evil, but joined should create evil.

Suppose it is said that there are evil spirits:—if they have their power from the gods, they cannot be evil; if from elsewhere, the gods do not make all things. If they do not make all things, then either they wish to and cannot, or they can and do not wish; neither of which is consistent with the idea of God. We may see, therefore, from these arguments, that there is no positive evil in the world.

It is in the activities of men that the evils appear, and that not of all men nor always. And as to these, if men sinned for the sake of evil, Nature itself would be evil. But if the adulterer thinks his adultery bad but his pleasure good, and the murderer thinks the murder bad but the money he gets by it good, and the man who does evil to an enemy thinks that to do evil is bad but to punish his enemy good, and if the soul commits all its sins in that way, then the evils are done for the sake of goodness. (In the same way, because in a given place light does not exist, there comes darkness, which has no positive existence.) The soul sins therefore because, while aiming at good, it makes mistakes about the good, because it is not Primary Essence. And we see many things done by the Gods to prevent it from making mistakes and to heal it when it has made them. Arts and sciences, curses and prayers, sacrifices and initiations, laws and constitutions, judgements and punishments, all came into existence for the sake of preventing souls from sinning; and when they are gone forth from the body gods and spirits of purification cleanse them of their sins.*

* Arthur Darby Nock's commentary of the chapter primarily concerns itself with the historical context of the text, noting that while Sallustius is usually theologically aligned with Iamblichus and Julian, in this chapter he is in disagreement with them, rather following Proclus. (For example, Iamblichus speaks of evil spirits.)

sdi: Oil painting of the Heliconian Muse whispering inspiration to Hesiod. (Default)

Those [Gods] who watch over [the world] are Hestia, Athena, and Ares. [... But] if there is no ordering power[, ...] whence comes the fact that all things are for a purpose[? ... To] attribute men's acts of injustice and lust to Fate, is to make ourselves good and the Gods bad. [Sallustius VI, IX]

Herostratus, an Ephesian, set fire to the temple of Artemis at Ephesus, which had been begun by Chersiphron, and completed by Demetrius and Paeonius. It was burnt on the same night that Alexander the Great was born, B. C. 356, whereupon it was remarked by Hegesias the Magnesian, that the conflagration was not to be wondered at, since the goddess was absent from Ephesus, and attending on the delivery of Olympias[. ...] Herostratus was put to the torture for his deed, and confessed that he had fired the temple to immortalize himself. The Ephesians passed a decree condemning his name to oblivion; but Theopompus embalmed him in his history, like a fly in amber. [William Smith, Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology]

Of Hestia, we barely remember the name of Chersiphron. Of Athena, we have forgotten the names of the judges. But of Ares, we remember well the name of Herostratus.

We may not like Ares, but that does not mean He is not Good, and neither does it mean He does not look after His own.

sdi: Photograph of the title page of Sallustius' "On the Gods and the World." (on the gods and the world)

Good morning and happy Wednesday! Sallustius gives us another brief chapter this week, so let's dive right in, shall we?

XI. Concerning right and wrong Social Organization.*

Constitutions† also depend on the tripartite nature of the Soul. The rulers are analogous to Reason, the soldiers to Fight, the common folk to Desires.

Where all things are done according to Reason and the best man in the nation rules, it is a Kingdom; where more than one rule according to Reason and Fight, it is an Aristocracy; where the government is according to Desire and offices depend on money,‡ that constitution is called a Timocracy. The contraries are: to Kingdom tyranny, for Kingdom does all things with the guidance of reason and tyranny nothing; to Aristocracy oligarchy, when not the best people but a few of the worst are rulers; to Timocracy democracy, when not the rich but the common folk possess the whole power.

* Gilbert Murray notes, "This section is a meagre reminiscence of Plato's discussion in Repub. viii. The interest in politics and government had died out with the loss of political freedom." Thomas Taylor notes similarly, and further recommends Proclus' Commentaries on it.

† That is, political constitutions. Taylor gives "polities."

‡ Taylor gives "property," while Arthur Darby Nock gives "wealth."

sdi: Photograph of the title page of Sallustius' "On the Gods and the World." (on the gods and the world)

Happy Wednesday, and a Happy New Year as well! All books written in 1926, including Arthur Darby Nock's 1926 translation of Sallustius, are finally in the public domain. What this means for us is that I may now excerpt his commentary in addition to his footnotes, and will try to do so where helpful.

Let's pick the puzzle-box back up, shall we?

X. Concerning Virtue and Vice.

The doctrine of Virtue and Vice depends on that of the Soul. When the irrational soul enters into the body and immediately produces Fight and Desire, the rational soul, put in authority over all these, makes the soul tripartite, composed of Reason, Fight, and Desire.* Virtue in the region of Reason is Wisdom, in the region of Fight is Courage, in the region of Desire it is Temperance: the virtue of the whole Soul is Righteousness.† It is for Reason to judge what is right, for Fight in obedience to Reason to despise things that appear terrible, for Desire to pursue not the apparently desirable, but, that which is with Reason desirable.‡ When these things are so, we have a righteous life; for righteousness in matters of property is but a small part of virtue. And thus we shall find all four virtues in properly trained men, but among the untrained one may be brave and unjust, another temperate and stupid, another prudent and unprincipled. Indeed these qualities should not be called Virtues when they are devoid of Reason and imperfect and found in irrational beings. Vice should be regarded as consisting of the opposite elements. In Reason it is Folly, in Fight, Cowardice, in Desire, Intemperance, in the whole soul, Unrighteousness.§

The virtues are produced by the right social organization and by good rearing and education, the vices by the opposite.

* Thomas Taylor calls these "reason, anger, and desire." Arthur Darby Nock calls these "reason, spirit, and desire."

† Taylor gives the four virtues as "prudence, fortitude, temperance, and justice." Nock gives "wisdom, courage, temperance, and justice."

‡ That is, not to pursue base desires but instead to desire that which Reason dictates.

§ Taylor gives "folly, fear, intemperance, and injustice." Nock gives "folly, cowardice, intemperance, injustice."

sdi: Photograph of the title page of Sallustius' "On the Gods and the World." (on the gods and the world)

Again a happy Wednesday to all! Let us honor clever Mercury by speaking of one of His favored subjects, since this week's chapter of Sallustius concerns astrology. (One of my favored subjects, too!)

IX. On Providence, Fate, and Fortune.

This is enough to show the Providence of the Gods. For whence comes the ordering of the world, if there is no ordering power? And whence comes the fact that all things are for a purpose: e. g. irrational soul that there may be sensation, and rational that the earth may be set in order?

But one can deduce the same result from the evidences of Providence in nature:* e. g. the eyes have been made transparent with a view to seeing; the nostrils are above the mouth to distinguish bad-smelling foods; the front teeth are sharp to cut food, the back teeth broad to grind it. And we find every part of every object arranged on a similar principle. It is impossible that there should be so much providence in the last details, and none in the first principles. Then the arts of prophecy and of healing, which are part of the Cosmos, come of the good providence of the Gods.

All this care for the world, we must believe, is taken by the Gods without any act of will or labour. As bodies which possess some power produce their effects by merely existing: e. g. the sun gives light and heat by merely existing; so, and far more so, the Providence of the Gods acts without effort to itself and for the good of the objects of its forethought. This solves the problems of the Epicureans, who argue that what is Divine neither has trouble itself nor gives trouble to others.

The incorporeal providence of the Gods, both for bodies and for souls, is of this sort; but that which is of bodies and in bodies is different from this, and is called Fate, Heimarmenê, because the chain of causes (Heirmos) is more visible in the case of bodies; and it is for dealing with this Fate that the science of "Mathematic" has been discovered.†

Therefore, to believe that human things, especially their material constitution, are ordered not only by celestial beings but by the Celestial Bodies, is a reasonable and true belief. Reason shows that health and sickness, good fortune and bad fortune, arise according to our deserts from that source. But to attribute men's acts of injustice and lust to Fate, is to make ourselves good and the Gods bad. Unless by chance a man meant by such a statement that in general all things are for the good of the world and for those who are in a natural state, but that bad education or weakness of nature changes the goods of Fate for the worse. Just as it happens that the Sun, which is good for all, may be injurious to persons with ophthalmia or fever. Else why do the Massagetae eat their fathers, the Hebrews practise circumcision, and the Persians preserve rules of rank?‡§ Why do astrologers, while calling Saturn and Mars "malignant,"¶ proceed to make them good, attributing to them philosophy and royalty, generalships and treasures? And if they are going to talk of triangles and squares, it is absurd that gods should change their natures according to their position in space, while human virtue remains the same everywhere. Also the fact that the stars predict high or low rank for the father of the person whose horoscope is taken, teaches that they do not always make things happen but sometimes only indicate things. For how could things which preceded the birth depend upon the birth?

Further, as there is Providence and Fate concerned with nations and cities, and also concerned with each individual, so there is also Fortune, which should next be treated. That power of the gods which orders for the good things which are not uniform, and which happen contrary to expectation, is commonly called Fortune,# and it is for this reason that the goddess is especially worshipped in public by cities; for every city consists of elements which are not uniform. Fortune has power beneath the moon,Δ since above the moon no single thing can happen by fortune.

If Fortune makes a wicked man prosperous and a good man poor, there is no need to wonder. For the wicked regard wealth as everything, the good as nothing. And the good fortune of the bad cannot take away their badness, while virtue alone will be enough for the good.

* Thomas Taylor notes, "See more on this interesting subject in my translation of Plotinus on Providence."

† Gilbert Murray notes, "i. e. Astrology, dealing with the 'Celestial Bodies.'" Taylor gives "the mathematical art." Arthur Darby Nock gives "the art of astrology."

‡ Murray notes, "Cf. Hdt. i. 134."

§ Nock expands upon this line in his commentary: "If Fate rules all, why do whole nations practice queer customs? <Their members cannot all have the same horoscopes.>"

¶ Nerd that I am, I note with some disappointment that not a single author uses the proper term of art, "malefic." Taylor uses "noxious;" Murray, "malignant;" and Nock "maleficent."

# Taylor notes, "Fortune may likewise be defined, that deific distribution which causes every thing to fill up the lot assigned to it, by the condition of its being; and as that divine power which congregates all sublunary causes, and enables them to confer on sublunary effects that particular good which their nature and merits eminently deserve."

Δ Nock gives "Fortune's power rests in the moon," but notes that "Fortune's power extends to the moon," is also a supportable interpretation.

sdi: Oil painting of the Heliconian Muse whispering inspiration to Hesiod. (Default)

Let's take Sallustius' words as given and assume that the Gods are those beings that Cause but are not Caused. Therefore each God is an eternal fixed point, dependent only upon themselves.

Let's also consider omniscience. A Mind, to understand something, must encode that information somehow. This can either be done directly (for example, our brains can be said to perfectly encode their own electrical signals, since that's what they are), or indirectly (those electrical signals may encode sensory signals of external things). But this indirect form is a lossy process ("the map is not the territory"), which implies that the only way to be omniscient of something is to contain its original, since the alternative is to only have a lossy view of it (and a lossy comprehension cannot be considered complete).

But the Gods are not contained within each other—this would violate our original axiom. Thus the Gods cannot be omniscient—except, of course, in the aggregate, since they collectively give rise to the Cosmos. But there is no way to recover this collective information, as it is broken into disjoint spheres.

In a smaller sense, though, the Gods—even secondary or tertiary ones—can presumably be omniscient of something, if that something is within their causal sphere. Insofar as Apollo gives rise to Asclepius, Apollo is omniscient of Asclepius. Insofar as Asclepius gives rise to Hygeia, Asclepius is omniscient of Hygeia.

I think this lack of omniscience is an interesting consequence of polytheism, and helps make sense of both myth and everyday experience, where it appears that the Gods are "warring" with each other. The apparent conflict is a necessary consequence of the Gods being limited in their domains, but also collectively composing the definition of the cosmos.

sdi: Photograph of the title page of Sallustius' "On the Gods and the World." (on the gods and the world)

Happy Wednesday! and to those who celebrate them, a happy belated solstice and early merry Christmas. Let's pick the puzzle-box back up and continue this second third of Sallustius, shall we?

VIII. On Mind and Soul, and that the latter is immortal.

There is a certain force,* less primary than Being but more primary than the Soul, which draws its existence from Being and completes the Soul as the Sun completes the eyes. Of Souls some are rational and immortal, some irrational and mortal. The former are derived from the first Gods, the latter from the secondary.

First, we must consider what soul is. It is, then, that by which the animate differs from the inanimate. The difference lies in motion, sensation, imagination, intelligence.† Soul, therefore, when irrational, is the life of sense and imagination; when rational, it is the life which controls sense and imagination and uses reason.

The irrational soul depends on the affections of the body; it feels desire and anger irrationally. The rational soul both, with the help of reason, despises the body, and, fighting against the irrational soul, produces either virtue or vice, according as it is victorious or defeated.

It must be immortal, both because it knows the gods (and nothing mortal knows‡ what is immortal), it looks down upon human affairs as though it stood outside them, and, like an unbodied thing, it is affected in the opposite way to the body. For while the body is young and fine, the soul blunders, but as the body grows old it attains its highest power. Again, every good soul uses mind; but no body can produce mind: for how should that which is without mind produce mind? Again, while Soul uses the body as an instrument, it is not in it; just as the engineer is not in his engines (although many engines move without being touched by any one). And if the Soul is often made to err by the body, that is not surprising. For the arts cannot perform their work when their instruments are spoilt.

* Gilbert Murray notes, "Proclus, Elem. Theol. xx, calls it ἡ νοερὰ φύσις ['he noera physis'], Natura Intellectualis. There are four degrees of existence: lowest of all, Bodies; above that, Soul; above all Souls, this 'Intellectual Nature'; above that, The One."

† Thomas Taylor notes, "In order to understand this distinction properly, it is necessary to observe, that the gnostic powers of the soul are five in number, viz. intellect, cogitation, (διανοια ['dianoia']) opinion, phantasy, sense. Intellect is that power by which we understand simple self-evident truths, called axioms, and are able to pass into contact with ideas themselves. But cogitation is that power which forms and perfects arguments and reasons. Opinion is that which knows the universal in sensible particulars, as that every man is a biped; and the conclusion of cogitation, as that every rational soul is immortal; but it only knows the οτι ['oti'], or that a thing is, but is perfectly ignorant of the διοτι ['dioti'], or why it is. And the phantasy is that power which apprehends things cloathed with figure, and may be called μοζφωτιχη νοησις ['mozphotiche noesis'], a figured intelligence. And, lastly, sense is that power which is distributed about the organs of sensation; which is mingled with passion in its judgement of things, and apprehends that only which falls upon, and agitates it externally. Again, the basis of the rational life is opinion; for the true man, or the rational soul, consists of intellect, cogitation, and opinion; but the summit of the irrational life is the phantasy. And opinion and phantasy are connected with each other; and the irrational is filled with powers from the rational life: so that the fictitious man commences from the phantasy; under which desire, like a many-headed savage beast, and anger, like a raging lion, subsist.

"But of these powers, intellect and sense do not employ a reasoning energy, on account of the acuteness and suddenness of their perceptions. And with respect to cogitation, it either assumes the principles of reasoning from intellect, which principles we call axioms; and in this case it produces demonstrative reasoning, the conclusions of which are always true, on account of the certainty of the axioms from which reason receives its increase: or the same cogitation converts itself to opinion, and deriving its principles from thence, forms dialectic reason, so called from its being employed by men in common discourse with each other; and hence its conclusions are not always true, because opinion is sometimes false: or, in the third place, cogitation conjoins itself with the phantasy, and in consequence of this produces vicious reasoning, which always embraces that which is false."

‡ Murray notes, "i. e. in the full sense of Gnôsis."

sdi: Photograph of the title page of Sallustius' "On the Gods and the World." (on the gods and the world)

Happy Wednesday to you all, again!

First, a little bit of housekeeping: my copy of Arthur Darby Nock's translation of On the Gods and the World finally arrived in the mail this last week, and I've begun studying it. While I find Murray's translation more generally readable, I appreciate Nock's scholarship—his appears to be a very precise translation. I plan to stick with Murray's translation even into the New Year (when Nock's becomes public domain), though I will be including Nock's notes and any ways in which his translation varies from Murray's and Taylor's. (In fact, I have gone back over the prior six chapters already.)

With that out of the way, let's pick the puzzle-box back up, shall we?

VII. On the Nature of the World and its Eternity.

The Cosmos itself must of necessity be indestructible and uncreated. Indestructible because, suppose it destroyed: the only possibility is to make one better than this or worse or the same or a chaos. If worse, the power which out of the better makes the worse must be bad. If better, the maker who did not make the better at first must be imperfect in power. If the same, there will be no use in making it; if a chaos... it is impious even to hear such a thing suggested. These reasons would suffice to show that the World is also uncreated: for if not destroyed, neither is it created. Everything that is created is subject to destruction. And further, since the Cosmos exists by the goodness of God it follows that God must always be good and the world exist. Just as light coexists with the Sun and with fire, and shadow coexists with a body.

Of the bodies in the Cosmos, some imitate Mind and move in orbits; some imitate Soul and move in a straight line, fire and air upward, earth and water downward. Of those that move in orbits the fixed sphere goes from the east, the Seven from the west. (This is so for various causes, especially lest the creation should be imperfect owing to the rapid circuit of the spheres.*)

The movement being different, the nature of the bodies must also be different; hence the celestial body does not burn or freeze what it touches, or do anything else that pertains to the four elements.†‡

And since the Cosmos is a sphere—the zodiac proves that—and in every sphere "down" means "towards the centre," for the centre is farthest distant from every point, and heavy things fall "down" and fall to the earth <it follows that the Earth is in the centre of the Cosmos.>

All these things are made by the Gods, ordered by Mind, moved by Soul. About the Gods we have spoken already.

* Gilbert Murray notes, "i. e. if the Firmament or Fixed Sphere moved in the same direction as the seven Planets, the speed would become too great. On the circular movement cf. Plot. Enn. ii. 2."

† Murray notes, "The fire of which the heavenly bodies are made is the πέμπτον σῶμα ['pempton soma'], matter, but different from earthly matter." He then references a line from a different section of his book, which reads, "The Gods themselves are said by Plato to be made of fire, and the Stars visibly are so. Though perhaps the heavenly Fire is really not our Fire at all, but a πέμπτον σῶμα, a 'Fifth Body,' seeing that it seems not to burn nor the Stars to be consumed."

‡ Thomas Taylor notes, "For the reason of this, see my Introduction to the Timæus of Plato."

sdi: Photograph of the title page of Sallustius' "On the Gods and the World." (on the gods and the world)

Good morning, and a sunny Wednesday to you all! Now we're really getting into the meat of it, so let's pick the puzzle-box back up, shall we?

VI. On Gods Cosmic and Hypercosmic.

Of the Gods some are of the world, Cosmic,* and some above the world, Hypercosmic. By the Cosmic I mean those who make the Cosmos. Of the Hypercosmic Gods some create Essence, some Mind, and some Soul.† Thus they have three orders; all of which may be found in treatises on the subject.

Of the Cosmic Gods some make the World be, others animate it, others harmonize it, consisting as it does of different elements; the fourth class keep it when harmonized.

These are four actions, each of which has a beginning, middle, and end, consequently there must be twelve gods governing the world.

Those who make the world are Zeus, Poseidon, and Hephaistos; those who animate it are Demeter, Hera, and Artemis; those who harmonize it are Apollo, Aphrodite, and Hermes; those who watch over it are Hestia, Athena, and Ares.‡§

One can see secret suggestions of this in their images. Apollo tunes a lyre; Athena is armed; Aphrodite is naked (because harmony creates beauty, and beauty in things seen is not covered).

While these twelve in the primary sense possess the world, we should consider that the other gods are contained in these. Dionysus in Zeus, for instance, Asklepios in Apollo, the Charites in Aphrodite.

We can also discern their various spheres: to Hestia belongs the Earth, to Poseidon water, to Hera air, to Hephaistos fire. And the six superior spheres to the gods to whom they are usually attributed. For Apollo and Artemis are to be taken for the Sun and Moon, the sphere of Kronos should be attributed to Demeter, the ether to Athena, while the heaven is common to all. Thus the orders, powers, and spheres of the Twelve Gods have been explained and celebrated in hymns.

* Gilbert Murray notes, "I translate κόσμος ['cosmos'] generally as 'World,' sometimes as 'Cosmos.' It always has the connotation of 'divine order.'"

† Arthur Darby Nock translates this line differently: "Of the supramundane some make the essences of the gods, some the intelligence, some the souls." (Emphasis mine.) That is, they don't just make Essence, Mind, and Soul generally, it is that the Hypercosmic Gods make the Cosmic Gods, which in turn go and make other things.

‡ Thomas Taylor notes, "Such of my English readers as are capable of ascending to a knowledge of the gods, through a regular course of philosophic discipline, may consult my translation of the Elements of Theology, by Proclus [p. 300], my Introduction to the Parmenides of Plato, and my Notes on the Cratylus, where the orders of the gods are more fully unfolded." I was unable to find a full online scan of Taylor's Cratylus, Phædo, Parmenides and Timæus of Plato, but it's still in print and easy to find.

§ Once again, here and below, Taylor uses the Roman deities: Jupiter, Neptune, Vulcan, Ceres, Juno, Diana, Mercury, Venus, Apollo, Vesta, Minerva (also Pallas), Mars, Bacchus, the Graces, and Saturn. Note that Taylor has swapped the order of Mercury and Apollo!

sdi: Photograph of the title page of Sallustius' "On the Gods and the World." (on the gods and the world)
Good morning, everyone! Once again, I wish you all a happy Wednesday. Let's pick the puzzle-box back up, shall we?

V. On the First Cause.

Next in order comes knowledge of the First Cause and the subsequent orders of the gods, then the nature of the world, the essence of intellect and of soul, then Providence, Fate, and Fortune, then to see Virtue and Vice and the various forms of social constitution good and bad that are formed from them, and from what possible source Evil came into the world.

Each of these subjects needs many long discussions; but there is perhaps no harm in stating them briefly, so that a disciple may not be completely ignorant about them.

It is proper to the First Cause to be One—for unity precedes multitude—and to surpass all things in power and goodness. Consequently all things must partake of it. For owing to its power nothing else can hinder it, and owing to its goodness it will not hold itself apart.

If the First Cause were Soul, all things would possess Soul.* If it were Mind, all things would possess Mind. If it were Being, all things would partake of Being.† And seeing this quality (i. e. Being) in all things, some men have thought that it was Being. Now if things simply were, without being good, this argument would be true, but if things that are are because of their goodness, and partake in the good, the First thing must needs be both beyond-Being and good. It is strong evidence of this that noble souls despise Being for the sake of the good, when they face death for their country or friends or for the sake of virtue.—After this inexpressible power come the orders of the Gods.

* Gilbert Murray notes (in an earlier note prefacing this work), "[I translate] ψυχή ['psyche'] always 'Soul,' to keep it distinct from ζωή ['zoe'], 'physical life,' though often 'Life' would be a more natural English equivalent." Soul, then, is the animating principle. Indeed, Taylor translates this line, "But if the first cause were soul, all things would be animated."

† Murray notes (in the same footnote as above), "[I translate] οὐσία ['ousia'] sometimes 'essence', sometimes 'being' (never 'substance' or 'nature')."

sdi: Photograph of the title page of Sallustius' "On the Gods and the World." (on the gods and the world)

Good morning, everyone, and a Happy Thanksgiving to those of you celebrating it tomorrow. Let's pick the puzzle-box back up, shall we?

IV. That the species of myth are five, with examples of each.

Of myths some are theological, some physical, some psychic,* and again some material, and some mixed from these last two. The theological are those myths which use no bodily form but contemplate the very essences of the Gods: e. g. Kronos† swallowing his children. Since God is intellectual, and all intellect returns into itself, this myth expresses in allegory the essence of God.

Myths may be regarded physically when they express the activities of the Gods in the world: e. g. people before now have regarded Kronos as Time, and calling the divisions of Time his sons say that the sons are swallowed by the father.

The psychic way is to regard the activities of the Soul itself: the Soul's acts of thought, though they pass on to other objects, nevertheless remain inside their begetters.

The material and last is that which the Egyptians have mostly used, owing to their ignorance, believing material objects actually to be Gods, and so calling them: e. g. they call the Earth Isis, moisture Osiris, heat Typhon, or again, water Kronos, the fruits of the earth Adonis, and wine Dionysus.‡

To say that these objects are sacred to the Gods, like various herbs and stones and animals, is possible to sensible men, but to say that they are gods is the notion of madmen—except, perhaps, in the sense in which both the orb of the sun and the ray which comes from the orb are colloquially called 'the Sun.'§

The mixed kind of myth may be seen in many instances: for example they say that in a banquet of the Gods Discord threw down a golden apple; the goddesses contended for it, and were sent by Zeus to Paris to be judged; Paris saw Aphrodite to be beautiful and gave her the apple. Here the banquet signifies the hyper-cosmic powers of the Gods; that is why they are all together. The golden apple is the world, which, being formed out of opposites, is naturally said to be "thrown by Discord." The different Gods bestow different gifts upon the world and are thus said to "contend for the apple." And the soul which lives according to sense—for that is what Paris is—not seeing the other powers in the world but only beauty, declares that the apple belongs to Aphrodite.

To take another myth, they say that the Mother of the Gods‖ seeing Attis lying by the river Gallus fell in love with him, took him, crowned him with her cap of stars, and thereafter kept him with her. He fell in love with a nymph and left the Mother to live with her. For this the Mother of the Gods made Attis go mad and cut off his genital organs and leave them with the Nymph, and then return and dwell with her.

Now the Mother of the Gods¶ is the principle that generates life; that is why she is called Mother. Attis is the creator# of all things which are born and die; that is why he is said to have been found by the river Gallus. For Gallus signifies the Galaxy, or Milky Way, the point at which body subject to passion begins.Δ Now as the primary gods make perfect the secondary, the Mother loves Attis and gives him celestial powers. That is what the cap means. Attis loves a nymph: the nymphs preside over generation, since all that is generated is fluid. But since the process of generation must be stopped somewhere, and not allowed to generate something worse than the worst, the Creator who makes these things casts away his generative powers into the creation and is joined to the gods again.◊ Now these things never happened, but always are. And Mind sees all things at once, but Reason (or Speech) expresses some first and others after.↓ Thus, as the myth is in accord with the Cosmos, we for that reason keep a festival imitating the Cosmos, for how could we attain higher order?

And at first we ourselves, having fallen from heaven and living with the Nymph, are in despondency, and abstain from corn and all rich☞ and unclean food, for both are hostile to the soul. Then comes the cutting of the tree and the fast, as though we also were cutting off the further process of generation. After that the feeding on milk, as though we were being born again; after which come rejoicings and garlands and, as it were, a return up to the Gods.

The season of the ritual is evidence to the truth of these explanations. The rites are performed about the Vernal Equinox, when the fruits of the earth are ceasing to be produced, and day is becoming longer than night, which applies well to Spirits rising higher. (At least, the other equinox is in mythology the time of the Rape of Korê,❦ which is the descent of the souls.)

May these explanations of the myths find favour in the eyes of the Gods themselves and the souls of those who wrote the myths.

* Thomas Taylor translates these five kinds of fables similarly, but instead of "psychic," he calls that kind "animastic (or belonging to soul)."

† This is probably of interest to none save myself, but here and below, Taylor favors the Roman deities rather than the Greek: Saturn, Bacchus, Jupiter, Venus, Proserpine. Curiously, Gilbert Murray and Arthur Darby Nock retain the Greek deities from the original but nonetheless name Discord and Strife, respectively (rather than Eris).

‡ Nock notes, "As Wendland remarks, Berl. phil. Woch. 1899, 1411, this sentence, in which Greek gods are named after Egyptian deities, apparently as in the same category, is clumsy, but the clumsiness may well be due to the author."

§ Murray notes, "e.g. when we say 'The sun is coming through the window,' or in Greek ἐξαίφνης ἥκων ἐκ τοῦ ἡλίου ['exaiphnes hekon ek tou heliou'], Plat. Rep. 516 E. This appears to mean that you can loosely apply the term 'Osiris' both to (i) the real Osiris and (ii) the corn which comes from him, as you can apply the name 'Sun' both to (i) the real orb and (ii) the ray that comes from the orb. However, Julian, Or. v, on the Sun suggests a different view—that both the orb and the ray are mere effects and symbols of the true spiritual Sun, as corn is of Osiris.

‖ Taylor notes, "See more concerning this species of fables in my Dissertation on the Eleusinian and Bacchic Mysteries."

Kybele.

# Here and below, Taylor translates "Creator" as "Demiurgus." Curiously, Murray capitalizes "Creator" below, but leaves it lowercase here.

Δ Murray notes, "ἄρχεσθαι ['archesthai'] Mr. L. W. Hunter, ἔρχεσθαι ['erchesthai'] MS. Above the Milky Way there is no such body, only σῶμα ἀπαθές ['soma apathes']. Cf. Macrob. in Somn. Scip. i. 12."

◊ Taylor notes, "This explanation of the fable is agreeable to that given by the Emperor Julian, in his Oration to the mother of the gods, my translation of which let the reader consult."

↓ Nock notes, "As Praechter explains, W. kl. Ph. 1900, 184, what is ever present to the nous is projected into the succession of historical events."

☞ Nock notes, "As for instance pomegranates, dates, fish, pork (H. Hepding, Attis, 156 f.)."

Persephone.

sdi: Photograph of the title page of Sallustius' "On the Gods and the World." (on the gods and the world)

Happy Wednesday, everyone! Let's pick the puzzle-box back up, shall we?

III. Concerning myths; that they are divine, and why.

We may well inquire, then, why the ancients forsook these doctrines and made use of myths. There is this first benefit from myths, that we have to search and do not have our minds idle.

That the myths are divine can be seen from those who have used them. Myths have been used by inspired poets, by the best of philosophers, by those who established the mysteries, and by the Gods themselves in oracles. But why the myths are divine it is the duty of Philosophy to inquire. Since all existing things rejoice in that which is like them and reject that which is unlike, the stories about the Gods ought to be like the Gods, so that they may both be worthy of the divine essence and make the Gods well disposed to those who speak of them: which could only be done by means of myths.

Now the myths represent the Gods themselves and the goodness of the Gods—subject always to the distinction of the speakable and the unspeakable, the revealed and the unrevealed, that which is clear and that which is hidden: since, just as the Gods have made the goods of sense common to all, but those of intellect only to the wise, so the myths state the existence of Gods to all, but who and what they are only to those who can understand.

They also represent the activities of the Gods. For one may call the World a Myth, in which bodies and things are visible, but souls and minds hidden. Besides, to wish to teach the whole truth about the Gods to all produces contempt in the foolish, because they cannot understand, and lack of zeal in the good; whereas to conceal the truth by myths prevents the contempt of the foolish, and compels the good to practice philosophy.

But why have they put in the myths stories of adultery, robbery, father-binding, and all the other absurdity? Is not that perhaps a thing worthy of admiration, done so that by means of the visible absurdity the Soul may immediately feel that the words are veils and believe the truth to be a mystery?*

* Thomas Taylor notes, "In addition to what the philosopher has said in this chapter concerning the utility of fables, we may observe farther, that fables when properly explained, call forth our unperverted conceptions of the gods; give a greater perfection to the divine part of our soul, through that ineffable sympathy which is possesses with more mystic concerns; heal the maladies of our phantasy, purify and illuminate its figured intellections, and elevate it in conjunction with the rational soul to that which is divine."

sdi: Photograph of the title page of Sallustius' "On the Gods and the World." (on the gods and the world)

My gratitude to those who participated in last week's discussion of Sallustius' On the Gods and the World—I am learning much, and we've hardly begun! So let's pick the puzzle-box back up, shall we?

II. That God is unchanging, unbegotten, eternal, incorporeal, and not in space.

Let the disciple be thus. Let the teachings be of the following sort. The essences of the Gods never came into existence (for that which always is never comes into existence; and that exists for ever which possesses primary force and by nature suffers nothing): neither do they consist of bodies; for even in bodies the powers are incorporeal. Neither are they contained by space; for that is a property of bodies. Neither are they separate from the First Cause nor from one another,* just as thoughts are not separate from mind nor acts of knowledge from the soul.

* Thomas Taylor notes, "The reader must not suppose from this, that the gods are nothing more than so many attributes of the first cause; for if this were the case, the first god would be multitude, but the one must always be prior to the many. But the gods, though they are profoundly united with their ineffable cause, are at the same time self-perfect essences; for the first cause is prior to self-perfection. Hence as the first cause is superessential, all the gods, from their union through the summits or blossoms of their natures with this incomprehensible god, will be likewise superessential; in the same manner as trees from being rooted in the earth are all of them earthly in an eminent degree. And as in this instance the earth itself is essentially distinct from the trees which it contains, so the highest god is transcendently distinct from the multitude of gods which he ineffably comprehends."

sdi: Photograph of the title page of Sallustius' "On the Gods and the World." (on the gods and the world)

Once upon a time, [personal profile] boccaderlupo recommended Sallustius' On the Gods and the World to me as a short introduction to Neoplatonism. But where he found it clear, I found it obscure! (I believe I described it to him as "a puzzle-box"—it seems to me that all the pieces fit together elegantly, but one needs to know the trick to open it up and get at the candy inside, and not knowing the trick all I could do was to play with it for a while before setting it down again.) Yesterday, I suggested perhaps starting up some discussion on the topic in the hopes that, with the help of other blind men, I might discover that this rope I'm touching is actually an elephant.

Therefore, I plan to post a chapter of the text each week (on Wednesday, in honor of the lord of dialogue), and perhaps we can unpack it together. I will only be posting the text in the subject post, and placing whatever thoughts and questions I may have down in the comments: after all, I am a student here rather than a lecturer, and anyway it might be helpful to break up discussion into parallel threads to keep things organized. Anyone is welcome to lurk, comment, ask their own questions, etc. I'll be transcribing from Gilbert Murray's 1925 translation, though I also have Thomas Taylor's 1793 translation handy and will call it out when there's something interesting. (Our good Br'er Wolf recommended Arthur Nock's 1926 translation, but I don't have a copy. It'll be in the public domain in a couple months, though, so perhaps we can revisit it then.)

Let's pick the puzzle-box up, shall we?

I. What the Disciple should be; and concerning Common Conceptions.

Those who wish to hear about the Gods should have been well guided from childhood, and not habituated to foolish beliefs. They should also be in disposition good and sensible, that they may properly attend to the teaching.

They ought also to know the Common Conceptions. Common Conceptions are those to which all men agree as soon as they are asked; for instance, that all God is good, free from passion,* free from change. For whatever suffers change does so for the worse or the better; if for the worse, it is made bad; if for the better, it must have been bad at first.

* Thomas Taylor's translation gives "without passivity." Arthur Darby Nock's gives "impassive."