![[personal profile]](https://www.dreamwidth.org/img/silk/identity/user.png){kind=small}
sdiLet's finish up the section, "Of Causes," which I started a few days ago, shall we?
Dodds astutely notes here that we have established two fundamental principles: the One, which works "downwards," giving existence to that which is below it; and the Good, which works "upwards," showing how every thing attempts to return or be united with its source. In this section, Proclus establishes that these two are, in fact, the same principle: in effect showing that where we come from is where we ultimately go to.
On the Identity of the One and the Good: the One and the Good are in fact two ways of looking at same principle—unity is good and good is unity—and this principle is the transcendent cause of every thing that exists.
XI. Every thing that exists is produced by one first cause.
We have previously established a strict ordering of causes [VII], which means that causation cannot be cyclic. Now, to know something is to understand its causes, and obviously we can be said to know some things; but this means that it cannot be the case, on one hand, that everything is uncaused (since there would be no causes to know) or, on the other, that there is an infinite regression of causes (since there would be no way to get to the bottom of anything and therefore knowledge would be impossible). So, there must be some number of first causes; but since we have previously established that one is prior to many [V], the first cause must be one.
XII. Every thing that exists is produced by the Good.
We have previously established that there is a transcendant principle, the Good, above everything that exists [VIII]; either it or something prior to it must be the first cause [XI]. But for something to be prior to the Good must mean that all things possess some higher character than "goodness," and what could this be?—by "higher," don't we just mean "more good?" And if the Good is universal, what could it mean to be "more universal" than the universal? So, to say there is something prior to the Good is nonsensical: therefore, the first cause must be the Good.
XIII. The One is the same as the Good.
The reason things desire good is that it conserves them and makes them whole. Conversely, unity is a good to things since if a thing lost its unity, it would dissolve into its components and cease to exist as a unified entity. But this is to say the same thing in two ways: if the Good implies one and the One implies good, then they must be the same. To become divided is to fall away from good; and to fall away from good is to become divided.
XIII is simple boolean logic: ((A→B)∧(B→A))↔(A↔B). (In fact, this is the usual way to prove equivalence.)
As I spend more time with the Elements of Theology, I continue to be convinced that it is not a systematization of Neoplationism: it's proofs aren't rigorous (indeed, many of them aren't proofs at all, but rather merely assertions), and Proclus was well-versed enough in mathematics to have known this. I'm also starting to think that it is not an introductory textbook of metaphysics, either: when one introduces a student to something, one wants to so enchant them with the material that they can't help but engage with it, but the Elements of Theology is off-putting in it's austerity—it contains only the bones of Neoplatonism and none of the meat (and certainly none of the animating fire which made Plotinus and Porphyry so fascinating). So what can it be?
I am coming to think that the Elements is a syllabus: a series of lecture notes which one could use to teach a course of metaphysics. None of the lessons is really given in any depth, but why should they be? They're just the prompts, as complete as the format requires, and any competent teacher would be able to flesh out these notes to the degree necessary and as the classroom requires.
no subject
Date: 2023-06-10 03:22 pm (UTC)