[Discussion] On the Gods and the World, Ch. XIII

[sdi]

Happy Wednesday! We are officially past the main body of Sallustius and onto the appendices. That doesn't mean these chapters are any less meaty, though: so let's pick the puzzle-box right back up, shall we?

XIII. How things eternal* are said to "be made."†

Concerning the Gods and the World and human things this account will suffice for those who are not able to go through the whole course of philosophy but yet have not souls beyond help.

It remains to explain how these objects were never made and are never separated one from another, since we ourselves have said above that the secondary substances were "made" by the first.

Everything made is made either by art or by a physical process or according to some power.‡ Now in art or nature the maker must needs be prior to the made: but the maker, according to power, constitutes the made absolutely together with itself, since its power is inseparable from it; as the sun makes light, fire makes heat, snow makes cold.

Now if the Gods make the world by art, they do not make it be, they make it be such as it is. For all art makes the form of the object. What therefore makes it to be?

If by a physical process, how in that case can the maker help giving part of himself to the made? As the Gods are incorporeal, the World ought to be incorporeal too. If it were argued that the Gods were bodies, then where would the power of incorporeal things come from? And if we were to admit it, it would follow that when the world decays, its maker must be decaying too, if he is a maker by physical process.

If the Gods make the world neither by art nor by physical process, it only remains that they make it by power. Everything so made subsists together with that which possesses the power. Neither can things so made be destroyed, except the power of the maker be taken away: so that those who believe in the destruction of the world,§ either deny the existence of the gods, or, while admitting it, deny God's power.

Therefore he who makes all things by his own power makes all things subsist together with himself. And since his power is the greatest power he must needs be the maker not only of men and animals, but of Gods, men, and spirits.‖ And the further removed the First God is from our nature, the more powers there must be between us and him.¶ For all things that are very far apart have many intermediate points between them.

* Thomas Taylor translates this word as "perpetual" and notes, "the Platonic philosophy makes a just and beautiful distinction between το αϊδιον ['to aidion'], the perpetual, and το αιωνιον ['to aionion'], the eternal. 'For the eternal,' says Olympiodorus, 'is a total now exempt from the past and future circulations of time, and totally subsisting in a present abiding now: but the perpetual subsists indeed always, but is behld in the three parts of time, the past, present, and future: hence we call God eternal on account of his being unconnected with time; but we do not denominate him perpetual, because he does not subsist in time.' Olympiodorus in Arist. Meteor. Hence the world may be properly called perpetual, but not eternal, as Boethius well observes; and the philosopher Sallust well knowing this distinction, uses, with great accuracy, the word perpetual in this chapter instead of the word eternal."

† Gilbert Murray notes, "γίγνεσθαι ['gignesthai']."

‡ Murray notes, "κατὰ δύναμιν ['kata dynamin'], secundum potentiam quandam; i. e. in accordance with some indwelling 'virtue' or quality." Arthur Darby Nock notes in his commentary, "creation κατὰ δύναμιν, as we have seen earlier, involves no toil for the gods."

§ Taylor notes, "meaning the Christians."

‖ Murray notes, "the repetition of ἀνθρώπους ['anthropous'] in this sentence seems to be a mistake." Taylor simply omits the second mention of "men," and Nock translates it as "angels (?)."

¶ Taylor notes, "for a more ample confirmation of the necessity that there should be gods posterior to the first, see my Introduction to the Parmenides."

Comments

[sdi]

Yes, he says "in virtue of a function."

[boccaderlupo]

To me, the sense is that, to your point, the gods are doing something, per se. It's their overwhelming effulgence that, without effort, give rise to the world and everything in it. And yes, without any diminishment in themselves.

Interesting his use of "First God" here. Is that also in Nock's translation (I beg your forgiveness for the ask, again)? The sense in the Timaeus, of Demiurge begetting the "younger" gods, seems to directly imply a hierarchy amongst the divinities that is, for whatever it's worth, at odds with the later Neoplatonic vision (and as Butler expresses in in his henadological approach).

[sdi]

Taylor and Nock both say "first god" (no capitalization).

I had assumed, when reading this, that this is referring to whatever first god (or level of god) is below the One. (As you know, I posit a "layered reality" version of this, whereupon each conclave of gods (or, at lower levels, archangels, angels, etc.) collectively give rise to the next level down of being. What's nice about Sallustius' arguments is that they hold regardless of which levels are being spoken of.)

[boccaderlupo]

I guess I will need to dive into Taylor on Parmenides. Thanks for the reference there.

[barefootwisdom]

Just a quick note, for checking text/translation, you can read Nock's edition on archive.org, here. It's their strange "1 hour checkout" model, but it works!

[boccaderlupo]

Ah, that's excellent. Thank you!