On Omniscience

[sdi]

Let's take Sallustius' words as given and assume that the Gods are those beings that Cause but are not Caused. Therefore each God is an eternal fixed point, dependent only upon themselves.

Let's also consider omniscience. A Mind, to understand something, must encode that information somehow. This can either be done directly (for example, our brains can be said to perfectly encode their own electrical signals, since that's what they are), or indirectly (those electrical signals may encode sensory signals of external things). But this indirect form is a lossy process ("the map is not the territory"), which implies that the only way to be omniscient of something is to contain its original, since the alternative is to only have a lossy view of it (and a lossy comprehension cannot be considered complete).

But the Gods are not contained within each other—this would violate our original axiom. Thus the Gods cannot be omniscient—except, of course, in the aggregate, since they collectively give rise to the Cosmos. But there is no way to recover this collective information, as it is broken into disjoint spheres.

In a smaller sense, though, the Gods—even secondary or tertiary ones—can presumably be omniscient of something, if that something is within their causal sphere. Insofar as Apollo gives rise to Asclepius, Apollo is omniscient of Asclepius. Insofar as Asclepius gives rise to Hygeia, Asclepius is omniscient of Hygeia.

I think this lack of omniscience is an interesting consequence of polytheism, and helps make sense of both myth and everyday experience, where it appears that the Gods are "warring" with each other. The apparent conflict is a necessary consequence of the Gods being limited in their domains, but also collectively composing the definition of the cosmos.

Comments

[sdi]

Thanks for this! I think I'm going to have to digest it for a while; I must confess that it makes less than zero sense to me presently.

[sdi]

For my own reference, I believe it's proposition 103 (rather than 93):

PROPOSITION CIII.

All things are in all, but each is appropriately in each.

For in being there are life and intellect; and in life being and thought; and in intellect being and life. But in intellect, indeed, all things subsist intellectually, in life vitally, and in being all things are truly beings. For since every thing subsists either according to cause, or according to hyparxis, or according to participation; and since in the first the others are according to cause; in the second the first is according to participation, and the third according to cause; and in the third the natures prior to it are according to participation,—this being the case, life and intellect have a prior or causal subsistence in being. Since, however, each thing is characterized according to hyparxis, and neither according to cause (for cause deals with effects,) nor according to participa­tion (for that is external of which a thing participates,)—hence in being there are truly life and thought, essen­tial life and essential intellect. And in life there is be­ing indeed according to participation, but thought ac­cording to cause. Each of these, however, subsists there vitally: for the hyparxis is according to life. And in in­tellect life and essence subsist according to participa­tion, and each of these subsists there intellectually. For the being or essence of intellect is gnostic, and life is knowledge.

The argument confuses me, I think I'll need to pick up an edition of Proclus with commentary...

[boccaderlupo]

As barefootwisdom mentioned, that is a good read from Butler...and the principle he mentioned is indeed crucial. To each god, then, as a supreme individual, the cosmos is a monotheism consisting of itself as the totality of all things, including all other gods. As you note, things do indeed get weird as we get to the deep metaphysics of Neoplatonist theory...

Another way of thinking about it, perhaps: if we accept that the gods are ontologically "prior," as it were, than things in the mundane world (starting with "Being" but including things like memory, space-time, et al.), then we cannot readily ascribe any limits to their knowledge. I can't quibble with your description of how information is encoded in the physical world, but the physical world itself is an emanation "downstream" as it were, from the gods. We can speak casually (and even in a more rigorous, scientific way) about physical processes in the mundane cosmos in this way, as it's convenient shorthand; but when we consider deep er ontological questions—and if we accept Neoplatonic theory, of course—we must reframe how we regard the relationship of the gods to the realms that reside "below" them. That's my conjecture, at least.

This does wrap back into Iamblichus, as well, because much of On the Mysteries involves Iamblichus reframing his interrogator's philosophical questions to just such an orientation, and the practical (for theurgic purposes) and theoretical implications of such a reframing.

[sdi]

I think I have something backwards. Didn't Sallustius say (daggered footnote) that Being was not only prior to the Gods, but also prior to Mind and Soul (which are, themselves, prior to the Gods, too)?

[boccaderlupo]

Hmm. I reckon, if I am reading right, that Nock translates it as hypercosmic gods producing Essence (of the cosmic gods), who then go on to produce other things down "the chain."

Will have to dig around some more...I think Proclus may have something on this matter (and Butler by way of Proclus). Regardless, good discussion and items for contemplation!

[barefootwisdom]

There are two options here.

1. Revise Nock's translation (in line with Murray, whom Nock criticizes in his own footnote), to read both genitives together: "Of the supramundane Gods, some create beings..."

2. The option that boccaderlupo gives us upthread.

Either way, hyperkosmiōn is an adjective that requires a noun; we supply that noun—"Gods"—from the previous sentence (and in option 1, it's explicitly there in this sentence, too).

[barefootwisdom]

Yes, my mistake. It's prop 103, which in the edition of E.R. Dodds, appears on page 93. Whoops! (Dodds' index is keyed to the page numbers rather than the proposition numbers, which encouraged my mistake.)

To your more substantive point: Does is help to use the metaphor of a hologram? In my (admittedly limited) understanding, a hologram contains an image of, and can project outward, the entire complex system, but each hologram will nonetheless be unique, based on the point in the system where it's located. In other words, lots of *different* holograms, all of which contain the entirety of the very same complex system.

[boccaderlupo]

Another one from Proclus that may be of interest here...

Prop CXLII(a): The Gods are present to all things in the same manner, but all things are not in the same manner present to the Gods. But every thing participates of their presence according to its own order and power...

Also, Antonio Vargas has a different translation of Proclus's text available for download as a PDF here.

His translation:

142a. The gods are present to all things in the same way, but not all things are present to the gods in the same way. Rather each thing incorporates according to its own order and powerthe divine presence.