For my own reference, I believe it's proposition 103 (rather than 93):
PROPOSITION CIII.
All things are in all, but each is appropriately in each.
For in being there are life and intellect; and in life being and thought; and in intellect being and life. But in intellect, indeed, all things subsist intellectually, in life vitally, and in being all things are truly beings. For since every thing subsists either according to cause, or according to hyparxis, or according to participation; and since in the first the others are according to cause; in the second the first is according to participation, and the third according to cause; and in the third the natures prior to it are according to participation,—this being the case, life and intellect have a prior or causal subsistence in being. Since, however, each thing is characterized according to hyparxis, and neither according to cause (for cause deals with effects,) nor according to participation (for that is external of which a thing participates,)—hence in being there are truly life and thought, essential life and essential intellect. And in life there is being indeed according to participation, but thought according to cause. Each of these, however, subsists there vitally: for the hyparxis is according to life. And in intellect life and essence subsist according to participation, and each of these subsists there intellectually. For the being or essence of intellect is gnostic, and life is knowledge.
The argument confuses me, I think I'll need to pick up an edition of Proclus with commentary...
no subject
Date: 2021-12-28 03:17 pm (UTC)The argument confuses me, I think I'll need to pick up an edition of Proclus with commentary...