[Discussion] On the Gods and the World, Ch. II

[sdi]

My gratitude to those who participated in last week's discussion of Sallustius' On the Gods and the World—I am learning much, and we've hardly begun! So let's pick the puzzle-box back up, shall we?

II. That God is unchanging, unbegotten, eternal, incorporeal, and not in space.

Let the disciple be thus. Let the teachings be of the following sort. The essences of the Gods never came into existence (for that which always is never comes into existence; and that exists for ever which possesses primary force and by nature suffers nothing): neither do they consist of bodies; for even in bodies the powers are incorporeal. Neither are they contained by space; for that is a property of bodies. Neither are they separate from the First Cause nor from one another,* just as thoughts are not separate from mind nor acts of knowledge from the soul.

* Thomas Taylor notes, "The reader must not suppose from this, that the gods are nothing more than so many attributes of the first cause; for if this were the case, the first god would be multitude, but the one must always be prior to the many. But the gods, though they are profoundly united with their ineffable cause, are at the same time self-perfect essences; for the first cause is prior to self-perfection. Hence as the first cause is superessential, all the gods, from their union through the summits or blossoms of their natures with this incomprehensible god, will be likewise superessential; in the same manner as trees from being rooted in the earth are all of them earthly in an eminent degree. And as in this instance the earth itself is essentially distinct from the trees which it contains, so the highest god is transcendently distinct from the multitude of gods which he ineffably comprehends."

Comments

[sdi]

neither do they consist of bodies; for even in bodies the powers are incorporeal.

I thought the rest of this chapter was quite logical, but this step lost me. Why don't the gods consist of bodies? Is Sallustius' saying that gods only consist of powers?

Indeed, what are "the powers" referred to, here? Taylor uses nearly identical wording, and so sheds no light. I'm assuming things like thoughts and feelings, which may have bodily expression but are not, themselves, of the body?

[boccaderlupo]

Enjoyed last week's post, and thanks for running with this series (and all the resource links).

This is where things get hairy, for sure, but also some clarity should emerge. Per Taylor's note, and in the sense that the gods are the ontological basis of all (the substrate, as it were), and that they are self-perfect individuals and utterly complete, they don't have bodies, per se, although they can arguably manifest in any form they so choose. Conceivably, this could be extended to powers, as well--any power, given that all things participate in some way the gods, might be ascribed to the gods (and thus utilized by the gods), although I sense that each individual has their particular proclivities. This is, at least, how I understand it.

For Taylor's comment on the relationship of the gods to The One, I would cross-reference Proclus's Elements, particularly starting with Propositions CXIV-CXX.

Axé

[sdi]

Are you saying that any being that possesses a body must exist at a "higher" ontological level? (I guess that sorta makes sense: if there wasn't, who would do the "possessing?")

I guess another way to state this is, a body is lifeless on its own, and requires some power to animate it? This strikes me as a second "Common Conception"... In that case the logical argument is simple: if the gods had a body, then they would require an animating power to animate that body, but an animating power acting upon them violates the argument made in Chapter I (that gods can only act, and cannot be acted upon), and therefore gods can't have bodies.

[boccaderlupo]

If by "possesses" in that first sentence you mean "takes possession of" then...perhaps? I hadn't thought about it that way, but I think that would hold.

Your second assertion brings up a whole lot of points that could be examined in light of later esoteric writings, of which I'm even less familiar, but...my belief is that us mortals have a tripartite structure (anima-spiritus-corpus, or soul-"etheric" body-material body). In my view, the gods exist at "higher" (non-corporeal) ontological strata, although the lower strata are, in effect, functions of the gods, administered by various intermediate spirits, although any particular god or gods could arguably intercede more directly, if they so chose. Again, these are my personal views, but I'd be interested in hearing others'.

Axé

[sdi]

By "possesses," I sorta meant both connotations:

• "I possess my body" in the sense that I have it, I own it, it belongs to me
• "I possess my body" in the sense that I animate or control it, like a puppeteer (e.g. in the same way we speak of "demonic possession", except ideally less malevolently)

But mostly, I'm less concerned with trying to mesh my beliefs with Sallustius' then simply trying to follow his logic. For example, perhaps the gods have a body consisting of a different form of matter than the sort we're used to. (e.g. our matter may be formed of energy, which itself is the "matter" of a higher plane of existence and is itself formed of an even higher substance, etc. etc. all the way back up the chain.) It is not clear to me whether Sallustius is speaking purely in material terms (that gods do not have bodies made of common matter) or if he is speaking more generally (that gods do not have bodies of any sort).

[boccaderlupo]

That's a good question, and I suppose it goes to the heart of what people of that era thought of when it comes to bodies--given the gulf of time and place, I don't have an answer on that one, and it'd take somebody smarter than me to offer a decent answer. My hunch is that they didn't believe gods had a body in the material sense that you and I may think of it--that fleshy casing that struts around in good ol' spacetime.

[sdi]

I spent some time digging into this.

Murray notes (in a footnote to the title of the text that I did not transcribe) that he generally translates σῶμα as "body" (but sometimes as "matter"). Looking σῶμα up in a dictionary gives "the body of a man" (as opposed to the soul), or more generally, "any material substance."

So it seems this is talking strictly about material bodies, and possibly even about human bodies. This is in agreement with your hunch.

[boccaderlupo]

Interesting. Thanks for the research. I tend to make assumptions about this stuff, but it's worth remembering that communications are fraught event between two people speaking the same language in the same culture, let alone trying to glean insights from philosophic texts across centuries and continents.

To the validity of your original question, though, you bring up a good point: in myths, we find the gods bleeding "ichor," which certainly suggests a material body, even if it's of different material than yours or mine. So it would seem there's a diversity of views even within a given cultural tradition.

[sdi]

You're probably wise to make assumptions: as even though you may go astray, it's difficult to penetrate very far without them! For my own part, I'm probably too timid in making them...

[boccaderlupo]

What I find interesting about your approach is your commitment to trying to understand the writer on their own terms, which is both charitable and leads to discussions such as this. So, kudos!