[Discussion] On the Gods and the World, Ch. I

[sdi]

Once upon a time, boccaderlupo recommended Sallustius' On the Gods and the World to me as a short introduction to Neoplatonism. But where he found it clear, I found it obscure! (I believe I described it to him as "a puzzle-box"—it seems to me that all the pieces fit together elegantly, but one needs to know the trick to open it up and get at the candy inside, and not knowing the trick all I could do was to play with it for a while before setting it down again.) Yesterday, I suggested perhaps starting up some discussion on the topic in the hopes that, with the help of other blind men, I might discover that this rope I'm touching is actually an elephant.

Therefore, I plan to post a chapter of the text each week (on Wednesday, in honor of the lord of dialogue), and perhaps we can unpack it together. I will only be posting the text in the subject post, and placing whatever thoughts and questions I may have down in the comments: after all, I am a student here rather than a lecturer, and anyway it might be helpful to break up discussion into parallel threads to keep things organized. Anyone is welcome to lurk, comment, ask their own questions, etc. I'll be transcribing from Gilbert Murray's 1925 translation, though I also have Thomas Taylor's 1793 translation handy and will call it out when there's something interesting. (Our good Br'er Wolf recommended Arthur Nock's 1926 translation, but I don't have a copy. It'll be in the public domain in a couple months, though, so perhaps we can revisit it then.)

Let's pick the puzzle-box up, shall we?

I. What the Disciple should be; and concerning Common Conceptions.

Those who wish to hear about the Gods should have been well guided from childhood, and not habituated to foolish beliefs. They should also be in disposition good and sensible, that they may properly attend to the teaching.

They ought also to know the Common Conceptions. Common Conceptions are those to which all men agree as soon as they are asked; for instance, that all God is good, free from passion,* free from change. For whatever suffers change does so for the worse or the better; if for the worse, it is made bad; if for the better, it must have been bad at first.

* Thomas Taylor's translation gives "without passivity." Arthur Darby Nock's gives "impassive."

Comments

[barefootwisdom]

I think we can take this a little less literally. On the traditional Platonist ladder of virtues, all four of the cardinal virtues appear over and over again, at each of three (or 5, or 6, or 7) levels, each building on those that came before.

We start from the physical virtues (which are basically innate, but can be cultivated in some degree?), then the virtues of habit (this is the hook to "habituation" in the chapter here), and only then progressing to the virtues that are properly the provence of reasoning and philosophy.

So while it's certainly best if we've been building the proper habits from childhood, we're always either reinforcing old habits or inculcating new ones. So Sallustius' more general point—and that of the wider tradition—seems to be that good habits, and the character associated with them, set the stage for philosophical and theological reflection. The critical error, then, is to think that we can jump to theology without taking account of, and cultivating, that basic character.

("Habit" and "character" are, in Greek, both related to the ethos family of terms, from whence "ethics.")

[sdi]

I think your interpretation of that paragraph makes sense.

You lost me with your argument though: I'm not familiar with any of the concepts you're using. "Cardinal virtues" was easy enough to search for—I knew I'd end up having to read The Republic eventually, but have honestly been dreading it!—but I wasn't able to find "ladder of virtues," and am not sure what you mean by the three/five/six/seven "levels", "physical virtues", "virtues of habit", etc.

[barefootwisdom]

Yeah, sorry about that. I was shooting that comment off in a hurry, and didn't fully (or at all, really!) explain myself.

In a nutshell, this basic set of virtues (a.k.a. excellences) occur at a variety of levels: the virtues that come along with our individual material nature (which we only have "control" over in the sense that we chose this particular life when we were between incarnations, as Plato discusses in Republic book X), the virtues that we acquire through habit, various kinds of virtues that involve the intellect and rational choice, and finally the theurgic virtues that transcend the rational. At each of these levels, all four cardinal virtues of justice, temperance, courage, and wisdom reappear in a new guise.

I could write a whole essay about this, but Michael Griffin has already done that, in his introduction to Olympiodorus' commentary on the Alcibiades; it's available free here: https://www.academia.edu/25871670/Olympiodorus_On_Plato_First_Alcibiades_10-28_Bloomsbury_Academic_2016_

I hope this helps at least a little bit!

[sdi]

Thank you!