Elements of Theology 19: On Forms

After Wholes and Parts, this is the second half of the section Dodds calls "Of Wholes and Parts." It is not a difficult section—certainly not difficult enough to justify taking two whole months to complete—but today is the first day in a long time my health has been good enough that my brain isn't completely fogged over, and so I leapt at the chance to finally study some philosophy again. Proclus has already discussed the creative potency of various grades of being; in this section, he discusses some of the ramifications of this from the perspective of the qualities lent to lower things by their creators.

On Forms: The qualities lent to a thing by its various causes reflect the same ontological structure as the causes themselves. Furthermore, we can divide these qualities into three categories: existence, wholeness, and form, each greater than the next.

LXX. The qualities lent to a thing by a higher cause are in effect both before and after the qualities lent to a thing by a lower cause.

Let us begin with the example of a human being: it must exist before it has life [(e.g. it is conceived before it is born)], and it must have life before it has reason [(e.g. it is born before it matures)]; similarly, reason departs from it before life does [(e.g. it becomes senile before it dies)], and life departs from it before existence does [(e.g. it becomes a corpse before it decays)].

As in the example, so in every case; this is because higher causes are more efficacious than lower ones [LVI], and a more potent cause has primacy over a less potent cause [LVII]. So, a higher cause must act before the lower cause can, because the lower cause is present in the higher and can only act concomitantly with the higher. Therefore, the lower must come into effect after the higher, and withdraw before the higher.

LXXI. The qualities of lower causes lent to a thing are made out of the qualities of higher causes lent to a thing as a byproduct of the same process by which the lower causes exist within the higher causes.

Recall that higher causes produce a greater number of effects than lower causes [LVII]. Since higher causes operate prior to lower causes [LXX], we must presume that a thing's receptivity to a lower cause is, in fact, among the effects of the higher cause; because of this, the effects of the higher are foundational to the effects of the lower, which are built on top of them.

LXXII. The more fundamental a quality a thing possesses, the more universal its cause.

The cause of more numerous effects are closer to the One than the cause of less numerous effects [LX]. But the effects of this more numerous cause are foundational to the effects of this less numerous cause [LXXI]. Therefore, if one effect is foundational to another, its cause must be closer to the One, which is to say, more universal.

From this we can make a couple inferences:

• Matter is devoid of form because it is a universal substrate. Therefore, it must proceed from the universal Cause.

• Inanimate bodies [(e.g. corpses)] exist, therefore the body must proceed from a cause prior to the animating soul.

LXXIII. Existence is prior to wholeness.

Either existence and wholeness are the same thing or else one must be prior to the other. But every whole consists of parts [XLVII], and those parts exist even though they are not whole; therefore, existence and wholeness are not the same, and one must be prior to the other. Suppose wholeness is prior to existence: then, every thing that exists is a whole; but then there would be no parts to compose those wholes, since those parts would already be wholes. Therefore wholeness cannot be prior to existence, and the only possibility remaining is for existence to be prior to wholeness.

LXXIV. Wholeness is prior to forms.

Forms are wholes, as they are composed of the many things which exhibit that form. [(For example, the form of Beauty is composed of all beautiful things that exist, which we say participate in Beauty.)] However, we have also posited ones [VI] which are wholes but cannot be forms (since they are atomic and cannot consist of anything). Therefore, wholeness and formness aren't the same thing, and since forms are wholes, wholeness must be prior to forms.

From LXXIII and LXXIV, we may say that wholeness occupies a middle position between existence and forms.

If you think my title to LXXI is bad, you should see Proclus's. Yeesh.

Proclus is at odds with Plotinus in his corrolaries to LXXII as a direct consequence of his doctrine of Monads. Proclus is deriving Matter directly from the One; while to Plotinus, Matter doesn't even exist, rather it is an abstraction representing the limit of what does. Similarly, Proclus places the Body Monad above individual souls; while if I understand Plotinus aright, souls emanate bodies, but those are sluggish and take a while to catch up to the state of a soul, and hence a body lingers for a while even after the soul withdraws. With all that said, while I think Proclus is misapplying the principle, I think the principle itself is a very useful one and worth bearing in mind.

Regarding LXXIV, didn't Proclus say that wholeness was itself a form in LXIX? So I guess what he's saying here is that everything participates in forms, but forms themselves participate in the special form of wholeness, in the same way that all things participate in the special thing of the One.