Elements of Theology 18: Wholes and Parts

[sdi]

Dodds calls the next section of the Elements of Theology, consisting of propositions LXVI through LXXIV, "Of Wholes and Parts." I'm going to take it in two parts, I think: in this first part, Proclus describes the ways in which things can relate to each other, which seem to me to be building blocks leading up to something in the future.

Wholes and Parts: Everything (except the One) is a part of something else, but there are three different categories of parts: a part may participate in a transcendent whole, a part may be a constituent in an imminent whole, or a part may have the whole reflected within it. The nature of wholeness a thing has is related to its degree of creative power.

LXVI. There are four ways in which things can relate to each other: the first can be a part of the second, the second can be a part of the first, the first and second can be identical, or the first and second can be wholly different.

Of two things, either the first is a part of the second, the second is a part of the first, or the two are not parts of each other. In this latter case, either the two are both contained within some third thing (in which case they are the same from the perspective of that third thing), or not (in which case they are different from the perspective of that third thing). [Because one's choice of third thing matters, these last two cases are relative: everything is identical from the perspective of the One, but everything is different from the perspective of a body.]

LXVII. There are three kinds of wholes: the whole which pre-exists its parts [(e.g. like the form of Beauty which allows its participants to be beautiful)], the whole which is made of its parts [(e.g. like flock is made of sheep)], and the whole which is implicit in its parts [(e.g. like geometry is implicit in each of its various theorems)].

In any whole, either the whole comes first (in which case the whole pre-exists its parts), or else the parts come first. Of those wholes in which the parts come first, either a lost part will diminish the whole (if the whole is defined as the collection of parts), or not (if the whole is implicit in each individual part).

These three cases reflect the relationship of things described in LXV: if effects subsist in a cause, the cause is a whole which pre-exists its parts; if things subsist within themselves, then the whole is a whole made of parts; if things subsist as a reflection of another, then the reflection is a whole implicit in its parts.

LXVIII. Every whole implicit in its parts is itself part of a whole made of parts.

Every part of a whole implicit in its parts is a part of something; but if it is only the part of the whole implicit within it, then it is only part of itself, which is absurd. So, it must also be a part of something else.

LXIX. Every whole made of parts participates in a whole which pre-exists its parts.

Every whole made of parts is a whole, but the wholeness can't come from its parts, since, with respect to the whole's own wholeness, they are parts. So we say the whole participates in the form of wholeness. Now, this form can't itself be a mere whole made of parts, since participants must have an unparticipated prior [XXIII]. Therefore, this form of wholeness must be a whole which pre-exists its parts.

(No matter how many times I type the word "transcendent"—and, thanks to Proclus, there have been many!—I always, always, always spell it wrong before spell-check catches me.)

I don't think the concepts that Proclus is getting at are too complicated today—even if his logic to get there is a bit specious—but his terminology is quite opaque and it took a lot of unpacking: Taylor's and Johnson's very inconsistent translations, and Dodds' very dense translation, were all working against me, here. I have added a number of clarifying remarks and examples in brackets. These are all my attempts at understanding the material, and so any errors or confusions are mine, rather than Proclus's!

Thomas Taylor—bless him—would ask me to underscore LXIX thrice: to him, it is a teaching of the greatest importance, and the beating heart of Plato. I'm not so sure I would go so far; as far as I understand Plotinus (and this isn't to say I'm correct, only that it is my understanding), only the One and Intellect are unitary: there is no one Soul-Monad (the World Soul being "merely" the first and greatest soul), and bodies are, of course, essentially indefinitely divisible (and hence illusory). (Further, I'm not sure I'd say the One is transcendent: everything is the One! Only the conscious experience of it is transcendent, I think, since "consciousness" begins with the reflexive Intellect.) Nonetheless, I would be remiss if I didn't point out just how big a deal he regards LXIX and it's association with LXV.

Comments

[sdi]

(Proclus' rebuttal to me would of course be, "But you acknowledge there are bodies, right? So surely there must be a whole universe consisting of those bodies?" And I just don't think there is except in the abstract. A human body all works together to some single purpose because it has a single soul; the physical universe, in my mind, does not have any single purpose because it does not have any single soul. As a result, I think while one can cutely say "the whole universe," it is not a whole in the same sense other things may be.)