Aug. 14th, 2023

sdi: Photograph of the title page of Proclus' "Elements of Theology." (elements of theology)

After On Self-Constitution, this is the second subsection of Dodds' section titled "Of the Self-Constituted." Proclus continues by discussing the nature of self-constituted things, particularly their atemporal nature.

On Perpetuity: Self-constituted things exist perpetually, having neither a beginning nor an end. They are also simple, not being made of parts.

XLV. No self-constituted thing has a beginning.

If something has a beginning, it is incomplete—in time, at least—and requires something else to complete it. But if a thing is self-constituted, it is independent and made complete by itself [XLI]. Therefore, a self-constituted thing cannot have a beginning.

XLVI. No self-constituted thing has an end.

A thing's cause is that which conserves it and makes it whole [XIII]. Therefore, "to end" means "to be severed from a thing's cause." But a self-constituted thing is its own cause, and it is impossible for a thing to be severed from itself. Therefore, self-constituted things do not end.

XLVII. Every self-constituted thing is simple (e.g. without parts).

[We present three separate proofs of this.]

  1. If a thing has parts, these parts must be different (or else they would not have separate identities). But since self-constituted things return to themselves [XLII, XXXIV], these parts must be one (that is, the same). This is a contradiction. Therefore, self-constituted things must not have parts.

  2. If a thing has parts, some parts will be better and others worse. But since self-constituted things return to themselves [XLII, XXXIV], the better will depend on the worse (and vice versa), but this is impossible because causes are better than effects [VII]. Therefore, self-constituted things must not have parts.

  3. If a thing has parts, those parts must exist before the composite that depends on them. But self-constituted things are independent. Therefore, self-constituted things must not have parts.

XLVIII. Every thing that is not perpetual is either composite (e.g. made of parts) or has an external cause.

Things that are not perpetual can end in one of two ways: either they dissolve into their constitutent components (which would require that the be made of parts), or else they cease to be by dissociating from their cause (which would require it have an external cause, since a thing cannot dissociate from itself).

XLIX. Every self-constituted thing is perpetual.

Every thing that is not perpetual is either composite or has an external cause [XLVIII]. But self-constituted things are simple [XLVII] and exist in themselves [XLI]. Therefore, self-constituted things are perpetual.

After how difficult the last section was, I was pleasantly surprised to find this one to be nice and easy! Here we have two proofs of the perpetual nature of incorporeals: XLV and XLVI, and XLVII through XLIX. Dodds notes that both proofs are traditional: the first is from Plato, and the second is from Aristotle, and apparently Proclus wished to include both. (I can't confirm this myself, as I've only read maybe a quarter of Plato so far, and none of Aristotle. But as I've noted, the Elements seems to me to be a course syllabus; it makes sense to want to emphasize the history of what you're teaching; perhaps this is the answer to one of my questions in the previous section, concerning why Proclus seems to prove the same thing multiple times. I should note that one would not do this if they were trying to construct a logical system!) Plotinus and Porphyry, at least, favored Aristotle's proof—in fact, the lack of parts of incorporeals is something of a linchpin in Plotinus' system, from which many other things are derived; whereas, to Proclus, it seems almost an afterthought, something that one gets out of the way to get to the real conclusion. I think Plotinus' way is the far more elegant: it would have been prettier if Proclus proved (something like) XLVII first, and then derived XV (and a bunch of other things) from it. Oh well—maybe someday I'll have polished my Neoplatonism 101 until it shines and that'll be a part of it.

Thomas Taylor, no less pernickety than Proclus, draws a very sharp distinction between "eternal" (which is outside of time) and "perpetual" (which is connected to time but always exists). By way of example he says that the demiurge is eternal, but the world is perpetual. (Obviously eternal is a much stronger constraint than perpetual is.) I don't see the point of being so precise, but I've kept his distinction just in case it matters later on.

Amusingly (to me, anyway), Dodds noted a few sections back that the Elements does not contain a proof of the eternity perpetuity of the world, while Taylor and Johnson note that this is exactly what XLVIII and XLIX prove. I disagree with Taylor and Johnson, here: the world is not self-constituted, as it is corporeal and self-constituted things are incorporeal [XLII, XV]. No, all this self-constituted business is talking about intellect and souls.

June 2025

S M T W T F S
123 4567
8 91011121314
151617 18192021
22232425 262728
29 30