Elements of Theology 14: On Eternity

Oof, my health is always a complete disaster come late summer, and this year was no exception: despite my best study habits, it literally took six weeks of grinding my head against this section to make it through! I had similar trouble last year with Plotinus. I got there in the end, though, and I guess that's a reminder that all it takes to move mountains—or, erm, a single page from a textbook—is patience.

(That said, I apologize if this section is less intelligible than the rest: I tried my best, but it's hard for me to gauge how my present best compares with my usual best.)

After On Self-Constitution and On Perpetuity, this section completes Dodds' section titled "Of the Self-Constituted," and also continues on into his next section, "On Time and Eternity." (I think the last couple propositions fit better here than either in the previous section or on their own.) Here, Proclus discusses the high-level nature of time.

On Eternity: Every thing is either eternal (in which case it always is and never changes) or temporal (in which case it always changes and never is). Every eternal thing and some temporal things are perpetual (e.g. exist for all time), but other temporal things only exist for a part of time.

L. Every thing that can be measured by time in essence is in the process of becoming in essence. Every thing that can be measured by time in activity is in the process of becoming in activity.

We distinguish two categories of things: those for which "past" and "future" are identical, and those for which they are different. Of the first, we say they are because they have a complete, whole existence, lacking nothing of themselves; but of the second, we say that they are always in the process of becoming, since they are not yet what they will be. Those things that have identical future and past cannot be measured by time, since how would we distinguish any given moment? Therefore, everything that can be measured by time is in the process of becoming, with respect to the way in which it can be measured.

LI. Every self-constituted thing is greater than things which are measured by time in essence.

Every thing measured by time in essence is in the process of becoming in essence [L]. Now, the process of "becoming something" means that that something is "beginning," but no self-constituted thing has a beginning [XLV]; therefore, self-constituted things cannot be measured by time and so transcend it.

LII. Every eternal thing is a simultaneous whole.

For a thing to be eternal means it cannot be measured by time, therefore it is not in the process of becoming [L]. Since it is not becoming, it cannot be broken up into parts (e.g. that which was and that which will be). Therefore, it must be whole.

LIII. Eternity is prior to all eternal things. Time is prior to all temporal things.

Recall that all qualities are threefold: there exists a transcendent Monad of that quality, which produces imminent participable things, which are finally participated in by things bearing that quality [XXIII]. From this it is obvious that, since "being eternal" is a quality, there is an Eternity, which produces eternities, each of which is participated in by a particular eternal thing; similarly, there is a Time, which produces times, each of which is participated in by a particular temporal thing.

LIV. Eternities are the measure of all eternal things. Times are the measure of all temporal things. There are no other measures.

A measure may either measure with respect to parts (e.g. like a ruler) or with respect to wholes (e.g. like a scale). Temporal things have parts [L] and must therefore be measured by parts. Eternal things do not have parts [LII] and must therefore be measured by wholes. Since this is a binary condition (having or not having parts), there are no other possibilities.

LV. Some temporal things are perpetual, while others are transient (e.g. only exist for a part of time).

Suppose all temporal things are transient. Then, they differ from eternal things in two respects: first, they are made of parts [L] while eternal things are not [LII]; second, they are subject to time while eternal things are not [L]. But recall that each degree of procession produces things as like itself as possible [XXIX]: this implies that there must be a mean term which differs in only one way from both eternal things and transient things [XXVIII]. So the mean term must either be eternal but not perpetual or else it must be perpetual but not eternal. The first is impossible, however, because eternal things are not subject to time at all and thus cannot be bound by it [L]. So the mean term must be perpetual but not eternal.

Therefore, we may observe that the greatest things bound by time are those that exist for all time, having neither beginning nor end; these possess perpetuity like eternal things do, but it is an ever-changing perpetuity of process, rather than an eternal, static perpetuity.

Proclus goes out of his way in L to distinguish between things measured by time in essence, and things measured by time in activity. He doesn't make use of the distinction here, but I assume it has to do with the difference between bodies (which are measured by time in existence) and souls (which are measured by time in activity, but have a timeless existence). I suppose we'll see as we go!

In LIII (and the corollary to LII, which I did not summarize), Proclus once again stakes out a position quite at odds with Plotinus. To Plotinus, every soul creates its own time as a byproduct of its sequential mode of consciousness, a position that prefigures Einstein's theory of relativity. Proclus, on the other hand, considers Time to be a monolithic entity under which temporality is bound (e.g. a god). Dodds notes that Proclus is following the Chaldean Oracles in this, which is, to my mind, rather unfortunate: while Plotinus' and Proclus' conceptions of time have the same explanatory power, Plotinus' is far simpler and more elegant, and so Occam's Razor would suggest we favor it.

But, ignoring my misgivings, you might recall that I was wondering what the deal was with Henads and Monads. This proposition gave me a chance to ponder it again and I think Monads are the term for the general principle, while Henads are a particular that apply only at the top of the chain: that is, the One is the original transcendent Monad; the Henads are the imminent things it produces, and finally the various levels of being—Intellect, Soul, Nature—are those things which participate in the Henads. At least, that's a guess: Proclus hasn't really talked about Henads yet, so we'll revisit it when he does.

The ruler/scale analogies in LIV are mine, not Proclus.' At least, that's how I understood what he was talking about... but if they seem confusing or worthless, feel free to ignore them.

In LV, we've finally discovered why Thomas Taylor is so very persnickety about eternity and perpetuity in the footnotes to literally everything he ever translated. That's a milestone of a sort—yay! Dodds notes that this proposition is crucial for establishing—in stubborn opposition to the Stoics, Gnostics, and Christians alike—the perpetuity of the world. Oddly, Proclus never makes that final leap anywhere (or, if he did, it didn't survive in the manuscript tradition), though it's easy enough to add ourselves if one assumes the world is the greatest temporal thing.

With that, we're a quarter of the way through the Elements! I started this read-along series four months ago, which means that if my pace holds steady, I can expect to finish about a year from now—longer than it took me to read the Enneads. I think I can safely conclude that the Elements is a more difficult work than the Enneads, and not one I'd recommend as a starting place.