Ammonius Saccas on the Union of Soul and Body

[sdi]

[Ammonius Saccas] said that it is in the nature of intelligibles both to be capable of union with things adapted to receive them, just as much as if they were things that would perish with them, and to remain, nevertheless, unconfused with them while in union, and imperishable, just as though they were merely juxtaposed. For, the union of bodies always involves some alteration in them as they enter into union, even, possibly, a being transformed into other bodies, as in the case of elements entering into compounds, food turning into blood, or blood turning into flesh or into other parts of the body. In the case of intelligibles, on the other hand, union takes place, and yet no change in them results. For an intelligible being is essentially such as not to suffer alteration. The alternatives are for it to withdraw from the union, or to suffer annihilation. An intelligible will not suffer transformation. Now, an intelligible cannot be annihilated, for if it could, it would not be an immortal. And, as the soul is life, if it were altered through the mingling with the body, it would become something different, and would not be life any more. What then would it contribute to the body, if it did not endow it with life?

Surely, then, the soul suffers no change, as the result of union with body. And if we may assume it proved that intelligibles cannot suffer any change of being, it follows of necessity that when intelligibles are in union with bodies, they do not perish in company with those bodies.

So the soul is united to the body, and, further, this union is without confusion. For union there is, as the sympathy shows, to wit, the community of feeling which is throughout the living creature, because it is one subject. And that it involves no confusion is clear from the way the soul has of separating itself from the body in sleep, leaving the body lying as if dead, only that it keeps the life just breathing in it, lest it should actually perish. Meanwhile the soul carries on an activity of its own in dreams, divining things to come and consorting with intelligibles. The same thing happens, also, when the soul meditates on some intelligible. For at such times, the soul seems to sever itself from body and claim its independence, that thus it may devote itself to realities.

The soul is incorporeal, and yet it has established its presence in every part of the body, just as much as if it were a partner to union involving the sacrifice of its proper nature. Nevertheless, it remains uncorrupted by body, just as if it were something quite distinct from it. Thus, on the one hand, the soul preserves its own independent unity of being, and on the other, it modifies whatever it indwells, in accordance with its own life, while itself suffering no reciprocal change. For, as the presence of the sun transforms the air into light, making the air luminous by uniting light with air, at once maintaining them distinct and yet melting them together, so likewise the soul is united to the body and yet remains distinct from it; the cases being different just in this, that the sun is a body, and circumscribed to its own portion of space, and therefore is not present everywhere where its light is present, any more than a flame is. For a flame is also, in a local sense, bound, to burning logs or to a wick, as the case may be, but the soul is incorporeal, and not circumscribed to a particular portion of space, but spreading entire throughout; like a sun that spread wherever its light reached, as well as throughout the body of the sun, not being just a part of the whole that it illuminates, as would be the case if it were not omnipresent in it. For it is not the body that masters the soul, but it is the soul that masters the body. Nor is the soul contained in the body, as if in a vessel, or bag. It might rather be said that the body is in the soul. For we must not think of intelligibles as liable to meet resistance from bodies. We should think of them as extending through the whole body, as though they ranged over them, or pervaded them. They must not, on the other hand, be supposed confined to some portion of space. For, since they are intelligibles, they have relativity only to intelligibles; that is, they must either be self-subsistent, or have their being within an intelligible of higher order. For example, the soul is, when engaged upon discursive thinking, an independent subject, but when engaged in the activity of intuitive apprehension it is, as it were, a part of universal mind. Therefore, if the soul is said to be in a body, it is not so said in the sense of being located in a body, but rather as being in habitual relation of presence there, even as God is said to be in us. For we may say that the soul is bound by habit to the body, or by an inclination or disposition towards it, just as we say that a lover is bound to his beloved, not meaning physically, or spatially, but habitually. For the soul is a thing that has neither size, bulk, or parts, transcending particular and local circumscription. For how can something indivisible be said to be locally circumscribed? Since place and bulk go together, place being the bounds of the enclosing thing, wherewithin it enclouses whatever is enclosed.

Suppose someone were to say, "well, then, my soul is in Alexandria and Rome and everywhere." He would be overlooking the fact that his form of speech itself implies locality, still. For the fact of being in Alexandria, or simply of being anywhere, implies place. Now, "in a place" the soul is certainly not, except by habit. For it has been shwon that the soul is incapable of being circumscribed to a place. Therefore, when an intelligible is in the relation of habit to a certain place, or to a certain thing conditioned by space, it is a catachrestic use of words, to say that it is "there," because its activity is there, and we are accepting the notion of locality in lieu of that habit, or activity. For, when we say, "soul is there," we ought to say, "its activity is there."

(Nemesius of Emesa on the Nature of Man XX–XXI, as translated by William Telfer. He notes that the scholarly consensus appears to be that Nemesius is quoting a commentary of Porphyry's, probably of Aristotle on the Soul. If so, this quotation of Ammonius is at fourth hand. See also Enneads I 1 and IV 3, and Sentences I–V, XVII–XVIII, XXXI.)